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Abstract 
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stable marriages, Theoretical Computer Science 127 (1994) 255-267. 
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algorithm is optimal - there is no on-line deterministic algorithm that achieves a competitive ratio 
better than (2n- 1) in all metric spaces. 
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pairs produced. We show that the simple “first come, first served” deterministic algorithm yields on 
the average O(n logn) unstable pairs, but in the worst case no deterministic or randomized on-line 
algorithm can do better than .Q(n’) unstable pairs. This appears to be the first on-line problem for 
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1. Introduction 
There has been a great deal of interest recently in studying the relative power of 
on-line vs. off-line algorithms [4,6,7]. On-line algorithms attempt to model a real life 
situation, where the entire input is not available beforehand. The input is obtained 
incrementally, and the algorithm has to make (irrevocable) decisions to respond to the 
input. Usually, the question of interest is: how “good” a solution can we obtain, given 
the fact that each part of the solution is obtained without a priori knowledge about 
the entire input. 
Typically, the on-line algorithm is compared to an optimal off-line algorithm that 
knows the entire request sequence in advance. The competitiveness of an on-line 
algorithm is the ratio of its performance to the performance of an optimal off-line 
algorithm. 
An optimal randomized on-line algorithm for bipartite matching (without weights) 
was given in [3]. In this paper we study two related problems - on-line weighted 
bipartite matching, and on-line stable marriages. 
1 .l. The weighted bipartite matching problem 
The weighted bipartite matching problem occupies a central place in combinatorial 
optimization, and has a variety of applications to transshipment problems. The 
problem is formally defined as follows: obtain a minimum weight perfect matching in 
an edge-weighted bipartite graph. (This problem is also known as the assignment 
problem.) We are able to give an optimal deterministic algorithm for on-line weighted 
bipartite matching, where the weights satisfy triangle inequality. 
On-line model: We assume that the graph is a weighted complete bipartite graph; 
the women vertices are all given in advance, and the men arrive one at a time 
(revealing weights on the edges to each of the women). The men have to be matched 
off immediately; once a man has been matched, we are not permitted to change his 
mate. The objective is to obtain a perfect matching of “small” total weight (compared 
to the minimum weight perfect matching). The competitiveness in our case is the ratio 
of the weight of the on-line matching to the weight of the minimum weight perfect 
matching. 
Without the triangle inequality imposed on the weights any (deterministic or 
randomized) on-line algorithm can have very bad competitiveness ratio, that exceeds 
any function of n. 
Results. We give a deterministic algorithm that is (2n- 1)-competitive if the edge 
weights are distances in some metric on the set of vertices. This algorithm is optimal 
_ any deterministic algorithm for on-line weighted bipartite matching (with triangle 
inequality) must perform as badly as (2n- 1) in arbitrary metric spaces. 
An interesting feature of our algorithm is that as each man arrives, it computes the 
best off-line maximum matching among the women and the currently arrived men to 
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determine the woman vertex to match with the newly arrived man vertex. The (2n - 1) 
bound is established by using the notion of augmenting paths. 
1.2. The stable marriage problem 
The other related problem that we study is the stable marriage problem. The 
stable marriage problem has been studied extensively for its rich structure [I], 
and is useful in several situations, e.g. assigning interns to hospitals, students to 
colleges, etc. The stable marriage problem is defined as follows: There are n men and 
n women. Each person provides a preference list that ranks the members of the 
opposite sex. Given a pairing of men and women, we say that a man and a woman 
form an unstable pair if they are not married, but prefer each other to their current 
partners. A matching is unstable if there is at least one unstable pair, and stable 
otherwise. 
On-line model: We study a natural on-line model in which we assume that all the 
women’s preference lists are known in advance, and the men’s preference lists are 
revealed one at a time. Each man has to be married off as soon as his preference list is 
revealed. This models the situation in which the hospitals rate the interns in advance, 
and the interns arrive one at a time with their ratings of the hospitals. 
How can one measure how “good” the obtained solution is? One way (that we 
consider) is to actually count the number of unstable pairs in any given marriage. 
A marriage is considered particularly “bad”, in case many men prefer many women 
who also prefer them to their current partners. These are all unstable pairs. Clearly, in 
a stable marriage the number of unstable pairs is zero, so we cannot measure the ratio 
of the on-line solution to the off-line solution. Our goal is to obtain an on-line 
algorithm with a “small” number of unstable pairs. 
We would like to note that there are many possible ways of measuring how “good” 
an obtained on-line solution is. For example, we could measure the number of 
divorces that need to be done to make the marriage a stable marriage. This measure 
would make sense in a situation where we actually had the opportunity to modify 
a solution obtained by an on-line algorithm. For our purposes, we have chosen to 
simply count the actual number of unstable pairs as a measure of the “quality” of the 
on-line solution. 
Results. Our results for the stable marriage problem are of a more pessimistic nature. 
We show that the simple “first come, first served” deterministic algorithm yields on 
the average O(n log n) unstable pairs, but in the worst case no deterministic algorithm 
can do better than Q(n2) unstable pairs. (An unstable pair is a man-woman pair that is 
not married to each other, but prefer each other to their current partners.) We also 
show that no randomized on-line algorithm can do better than Q(n2) unstable pairs. 
The proof for the randomized lower bound (see Theorem 3.6 in Section 3.2) makes use 
of Yao’s lemma [S]. This is the first on-line problem we know of where provably one 
cannot do better with randomization. 
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Related work: A (2n - 1) competitive algorithm for the weighted matching problem 
was obtained independently by [2] as well. 
2. On-line weighted bipartite matching 
We describe an on-line algorithm for minimum weight perfect matchings in bipar- 
tite graphs, where the edge weights obey the triangle inequality. We give an algorithm 
that produces a perfect matching with a weight at most 2n- 1 times the weight of the 
minimum weight perfect matching. We show that this is optimal for graphs obeying 
the triangle inequality.’ 
Let G = (R, B, E) be a complete bipartite graph, where R is a set of n red vertices and 
B is a set of n blue vertices. Suppose there is a metric d on R x B (satisfying the triangle 
inequality); for each red vertex ri and each blue vertex bj let the weight of edge (ri, bj) 
be Wij = d(ri, bj) > 0. Initially, the blue vertices are known; as each red vertex ri arrives 
(with its edge weights), the algorithm matches ri to one of the available blue vertices. 
Once matched, a pair cannot be separated later. The algorithm tries to produce the 
smallest weight perfect matching possible. 
If the weights do not obey the triangle inequality, no performance bound (for 
a deterministic algorithm) depending only on n is possible (see Fig. 1). To see 
this, consider the following small example. There are two blue vertices, b, and b,. 
The first red vertex rl has edges to bl and b2, each of weight 1. Let us assume 
that rl matches with bZ. Now r2 comes with edges to b, and b2 of weights W 
and 1, respectively. The only choice is to match rz with b,. The weight of the 
matching produced is W+ 1, whereas the optimal matching is of weight 2 (matching 
bi and ri). The performance ratio can be made arbitrarily bad by taking W arbitrarily 
large. 
Remark. The same holds when one is trying to design a randomized on-line algo- 
rithm. Using a theorem of Yao (Theorem 3.5, below), it is easy to construct a similar 
example showing that without the triangle inequality one cannot hope to get reason- 
able performance bounds for a randomized on-line algorithm. 
The algorithm for graphs obeying the triangle inequality is quite simple, but not 
immediately intuitive. The more intuitive greedy method (which matches a new red 
vertex to the closest available blue vertex) does extremely badly in the worst case. To 
see this, consider the following example in the real line R’ (see Fig. 2). The blue points 
(vertices) are placed as follows: bi is placed at location 2’-‘, for 1 did n - 1; we place 
b, at -0.1. We now locate rI at 0.5. Since the closest available blue vertex is b, (at l), 
’ By this we mean that the weight of any edge in the graph is at most the weight of any path between the 
two endpoints. 
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Fig. 1. Example to show that no ratio is possible without triangle inequality. 
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Fig. 2. Example to show that greedy does poorly 
we match rl to bi. Now, for 2 <i,< n locate ri at bi_ 1. Since b, is the closest available 
blue vertex, Yi is matched to bi. Finally, we must match r, to b,. The weight of the 
optimal off-line matching is obtained by matching pi with b,, and matching all the 
other red points ri to bi_ 1, at no cost. The weight of the optimal matching is constant, 
whereas the weight of the matching produced by the greedy method is at least 2”-l, so 
the performance ratio of the greedy method is exponential in n. 
2.1. The on-line algorithm 
Let Mk be the on-line matching computed by the algorithm after the arrival of rk. 
(Initially M0 and No are empty.) 
Step 1: At the arrival of rk, compute the off-line minimum weight maximum matching 
Nk matching rl, . . . , rk to the blue vertices. Without loss of generality, we can assume 
that Nk 0 Nk_ 1 consists of a single odd length augmenting path from rk to a blue 
vertex b,. (We will explain why in a moment.) 
Step 2: The vertex bk will be free in Mk_ 1 ; match rk to bk to obtain Mk. 
Lemma 2.1. Without loss of generality, we can assume that Nk@Nk_l consists of 
a single odd length augmenting path from rk to a blue vertex bk. 
Proof. The symmetric difference Nk @ Nk_ 1 is the disjoint union of paths and even- 
length cycles. If such a cycle exists, it cannot contain rk (since rk is unmatched in Nk _ i). 
Therefore, the total weight of the “even” edges in the cycle must equal the weight of the 
“odd” edges. (Otherwise, we could improve either Nk or Nk_ 1 .) So we can modify 
Nk so that Nk @ Nk_ 1 contains no cycles. 
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An even-length path cannot begin and end with red vertices, because there is only 
one red vertex (rk) which is matched in Nk, but not in Nk- 1. An even-length path 
which begins and ends with blue vertices cannot contain r,, As above, the total weight 
of the “even” edges in the path must equal the weight of the “odd” edges, and we can 
modify Nk so that Nk @ Nk _ 1 contains no even-length paths. 
Finally, an odd-length path in Nk @ Nk _ 1 must begin with rk, and end with a blue 
vertex, b,. 
Remark, Although the above guarantees that any off-line algorithm for minimum 
weight perfect matchings would suffice to compute Nk, we note that it is efficient to 
generate Nk from N,_ 1 by running a single phase of the primal-dual algorithm [S], 
which works by finding the augmenting path from rk to bk (in the “equality subgraph”). 
In this case, N, 0 Nk _ 1 is already just a single path. 
We show that bk is unmatched in Mk- 1 by showing that the set of matched blue 
vertices in Mk _ 1 is the same as in Nk_ 1. (By definition bk is free in Nk _ i ). 
Lemma 2.2. For each k, the set of blue vertices matched in Nk is the same as the set of 
blue vertices matched in Mk (the on-line matching). 
Proof. Suppose by induction that Mk_ 1 and Nk _ 1 have the same set of matched blue 
vertices. Then Nk takes on only the additional blue vertex b,, as does Mk. 0 
We now prove an upper bound on the weight of the matching produced by the 
algorithm. 
Theorem 2.3. The weight of M, is w(M,)<(2n- l)w(N,). 
Proof. Note w(N,)bw(N,)<... < w(N,). Consider the edge ek added at stage k. By 
the triangle inequality 
w(ek)dw(augmenting path from rk to bk) 
bw(N,)+w(Nk-1) 
Finally, w(M,)=Cw(e,)<(2n- l)w(N,). (Since w(e,)<w(N,).) q 
Remark. Although this analysis may seem overly pessimistic, there is an example in 
R’ to show that the algorithm’s performance ratio is no better than n. The blue points 
bl, bz, . . . , b, are placed at - 1, 2, -3, 4, -5, . . . , +n, and the red points rl, r2, . . . , r, 
are placed, in order of appearance, at 0, -1, 2, -3, . . . . T(n- 1). If n is odd, the 
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optimal matching pairs Y2i with bzi+ 1 and Yzi+ 1 with b2i (and rl with b,). If n is even, 
the optimal matching pairs r2i with b2i- 1 and r2i_ 1 with bzi. In each case the optimal 
matching has cost n. For each k, rk is matched in Mk with bk, at a cost of 2k- 1, so that 
w(M,)=C(2k- 1)=n2, or a factor of n over the optimal w(N,)=n. 
2.2. The lower bound 
Theorem 2.4. There is no deterministic on-line algorithm that achieves a performance 
ratio better than (2n- 1) for all metric spaces. 
Proof. Consider a “star” graph with n leaf vertices, and one center. The n blue vertices 
are placed at the leaf vertices of the star. The first red point is placed at the center; the 
on-line algorithm matches it to some leaf b, . From then on, rk is placed at bk_ 1. The 
weight of the on-line matching is 2n- 1, and the weight of the off-line matching is 1. 
(The weight of each edge on the star is 1.) 0 
Observation. Let us suppose that the points are chosen from some finite dimensional 
metric space (say Rd). Suppose the n blue vertices are placed at the grid points of a grid 
in Rd of side 1 unit, centered at the origin. The first red point is placed at the origin; the 
on-line algorithm matches it to some vertex b, of the cube. From then on, rk is placed 
at bk-l. The weight of the matching produced by any on-line algorithm in a(n), 
whereas the minimum weight perfect matching has weight nljd. (The matching is 
obtained by matching rl to b,, and ri to b,_ 1 for 2 <i<n.) Hence the performance 
ratio of any on-line algorithm is Q(nl -(lid)). 
Remark. In R2 we obtain a lower bound of only O(&). The algorithm’s performance 
ratio however is O(n), and this gap is very large. Is it possible to close this gap for the 
special cases of graphs in R’ and R2? If we go to d =logn dimensions (hypercube), 
then we can obtain a lower bound of Q(n/dF]). 
3. On-line stable marriages 
In this section we describe the stable marriage problem and its on-line version. 
An instance of the stable marriage problem consists of two disjoint sets of size n, 
the men and the women; associated with each person is an ordered preference list 
that ranks all the members of the opposite sex. The objective is to obtain a 
one-to-one correspondence (i.e. a perfect matching, or marriage) between the men and 
the women. 
We say that a man and a woman form an unstable pair for a marriage J%+ if the man 
and the woman are not married to each other, and each prefers the other to his/her 
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spouse. A marriage is unstable if there is at least one unstable pair, and stable 
otherwise. 
A stable marriage can always be found off-line; see [l] for a simple algorithm and 
an excellent survey of research done on the stable marriage problem. 
In the on-line version of the stable marriage problem, the women’s preference lists 
are specified in advance (call this the women’s matrix), and the men arrive in an 
arbitrary order. As each man arrives he provides his preference list and he is 
immediately assigned a mate from the pool of available women. It is not permitted to 
reassign any previously married woman. 
An on-line algorithm may produce unstable marriages. We are interested in on-line 
algorithms that produce a small number of unstable pairs. 
3.1. An on-line algorithm 
The obvious deterministic on-line algorithm produces a marriage with only 
O(n log n) unstable pairs in the average case. 
Algorithm. Assign each man his favorite available woman. 
Label the men 1, 2, . . . , n according to their order of arrival, and label the women 
arbitrarily. In the average case, each man’s preference list is a uniformly chosen 
random permutation. The above algorithm is independent of the women’s matrix. We 
give a specific women’s matrix which yields the worst-case behavior, and show that the 
average number of instabilities produced is O(n log n). 
Lemma 3.1. The algorithm behaves the worst when all the women prefer the men in order 
opposite to their arrival. 
Proof. The first man will not participate in any unstable pairs, since he marries his 
favorite woman. In general, the kth man will form an unstable pair only with those of 
the k - 1 previously married women he prefers over his wife, and who prefer him over 
their husbands. The expected number of instabilities involving man k is therefore 
maximized when all the k- 1 previously married women prefer him over their 
husbands. q 
Remark. Using this approach it is easy to see that every deterministic on-line 
algorithm will produce Q(n2) unstable pairs. 
Theorem 3.2. The natural “jrst come, first served” on-line marriage algorithm produces 
on average O(n log n) unstable pairs. 
Proof. Assume that the women’s matrix is arranged as in Lemma 3.1. Let Gk be the set 
of women available to man k; 1 Gk( = n- k + 1. Suppose that man k marries his jth 
choice; then man k is involved in j - 1 instabilities. Since Gk is uniformly distributed in 
man k’s preference list, we can show by a simple “balls and walls” symmetry argument 
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(with G, as the walls) that 
E(j--l)=S. 
To do so, imagine man k’s preference list arranged in a line, with each of the k- 1 
unavailable women represented as a “ball”, and each of the n - k + 1 available women 
represented as a “wall”. Then, with the walls uniformly distributed among the balls, 
we are interested in the expected position of the first wall, j, and the number j- 1 of 
balls in the first “bin”. If we imagine instead that the walls are placed first, and that the 
balls are added uniformly thereafter, intuition tells us that any ball is equally likely to 
fall into any of the n-k+ 2 bins. If intuition is not enough, reason that we have 
conditioned on the relative order of the walls, and condition further that a given ball 
lands in either the first or the second bin. So far we have conditioned that our ball and 
the first wall both appear before all the other walls. This is not enough to affect the 
relative order of our ball and the first wall (in a uniform distribution). Since it is 
equally likely that the ball lands in the first or second bin, these bins have equal 
expected sizes. In fact, all the bins have the same expected size, as asserted. 
Having the expected number of instabilities involving man k, we calculate that the 
expected total number of instabilities is 
Remark. It is clear that for the above women’s matrix, the “first come, first served” 
algorithm is average-case optimal. If we allow the women’s matrix to be random as 
well, the expected number of unstable pairs produced by our algorithm goes down 
only by half. However, for a random women’s matrix our algorithm may not be 
average-case optimal. 
A stable man or woman is one who is not involved in any unstable pairs. As might 
be expected, this algorithm produces lots of stable men, but very few stable women. 
Theorem 3.3. In the stable marriage produced by the on-line algorithm, the expected 
number of stable men is at least (n+ 1)/2. 
Proof. The probability that man k is stable is at least (n-k + 1)/n. Let Xk be a random 
variable that is 1 if and only if man k is stable (and 0, otherwise). Then the expected 
number of stable men is 
E(stable men)= i E(X,) 
k=l 
’ n-k+1 
a, 
k=l 
n+l =-- 
2 . 
0 
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Theorem 3.4. In the stable marriage produced by the on-line algorithm, f the women’s 
matrix is jixed, the expected number of stable women lies between R(log n) and n. If the 
women’s matrix is chosen randomly (i.e. each woman’s preference list is a random 
permutation of bI, . . . , b,), the expected number of stable women is only O(G). 
Proof. If the women’s matrix is fixed so that each woman prefers the men in their 
order of arrival (i.e. they like bI the best and b, the least), then the algorithm produces 
a stable marriage, with n stable women. 
We now show that the most unstable women arise if the women prefer the men 
opposite to the men’s order of arrival, in which case O(logn) stable women are 
expected. Let bI, bZ, . . . . b, denote the men in order of arrival, and let 
gn,rJ, gnt2), . . . , gncnJ denote their matches. Then, for any k, gn(k) is not unstable with 
b 1, . . . , bk_ 1 (since none of these men chose gn(k)), and for i > k gn(k) is unstable with bi if 
and only if &(k) appears before g=(i) in b;s preference list and grr(k) prefers bi to bk. 
Clearly, then, &(k) is most likely to be unstable if she prefers bk + 1, . . , b, over bk, and 
the highest expected number of unstable women occurs when all the women prefer the 
men in the order b,, . . . . b,. 
Suppose that the women’s matrix is so arranged; we will calculate the expected 
number of stable women produced by the algorithm. Let 
xk= 
i 
1 if gn(k) is stable, 
0 otherwise. 
Then we are trying to calculate 
is stable] 
= k$l i=k 1 Pr[ &(k) is stable with bi]. 
We know from the proof of Theorem 3.2 (“balls and walls”) that, for i > k, bi will prefer 
gn(k) to gn(i) with probability l/[n-(i- 1) + 11, Since we assume that gn(k) prefers bi 
to bk, 
Pr[g&) is stable with bi] = 1-A . 
It turns out that in this case the product above telescopes, and that the sum reduces to 
If we take the women’s matrix to be random, then 
Pr [ gnckj prefers b, to bk] = 3, 
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SO 
Pr[g,(,, is stable with bi]=i’ 1 +i. 
(l-&2). 
In this case, the kth term in the above sum is 
2(n-k)+ 1 7 5 3 
. ..-.-. 2(n-k)+2 8 6 4’ 
Using the fact that (2n - 1)(2n - 3) ... 7’5.3 = (2n)!/2”n! and Stirling’s approximation 
we approximate this term as 2/J-, and the entire sum as O(G). 0 
3.2. A worst-case lower bound 
Our lower bound is based on the following theorem due to Yao [S]: 
Theorem 3.5. Given a cost minimization problem, a randomized algorithm R, and an 
input distribution d, there is a deterministic algorithm A whose d-average case perfor- 
mance is better than R’s worst-case expected performance. 
The theorem says that a lower bound on the worst-case performance of randomized 
algorithms may be found by giving an input distribution d for which every determinis- 
tic algorithm does badly in the d-average case. 
Theorem 3.6. No on-line randomized (or deterministic) algorithm can achieve better 
than Q(n’) unstable pairs in the worst case. 
Proof. By Theorem 3.5 it suffices to exhibit a probability distribution on the prefer- 
ence lists for which no deterministic algorithm can achieve less than Q(n’) instabilities. 
As before, we stipulate that the women all prefer the men in order opposite to their 
arrival. We proceed to describe the distribution on the men’s matrix. 
Let g be a random permutation of the women. Then man k prefers the women in the 
order o(l), . . . , a(k), and the rest in a fixed arbitrary order (say, increasing numer- 
ically). The resulting men’s matrix, where row k contains man k’s preference list, is 
ordered by c below the main diagonal and is ordered numerically above the diagonal. 
We show that any deterministic algorithm produces on average n(n’) unstable 
pairs on this input distribution. First we show that if p is the number of men 1, . . . , n/2 
who marry among the women a(l), . . . , a(n/2), then the expected value of /3 is at least 
n/16. This is clearly true if in fact at least n/16 of the men 1, .,. , n/4 marry women 
among CJ(~), .. . . a(n/4). If this is not the case, then at least 3n/16 of the men 1, . . . , n/4 
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marry women o(n/4 + l), . . , o(n). Notice that any man 1, . . . , n/4 who marries among 
women a(n/4+ l), . . . , o(n) is equally likely to marry any of these women (i.e. the 
conditional probability distribution in this case is uniform). Therefore we expect that 
at least (1/3).(3n/16)=n/16 of the men 1, . . . . n/4 will marry in the range 
cr(n/4 + l), . . . , o(n/2). In either case we expect at least E(p) >, n/16 of the men 1, . . . , n/2 
to marry women o(l), . . . , a(n/2). 
Furthermore, at least /I of the men n/2 + 1, . . . , n marry women 0(n/2 + l), . . . , c(n) 
(by the process of elimination). Each of these men is unstable with at least /I women, so 
the total number of unstable pairs is at least 
E(B’)> [E(B)]'aLI(n'). EJ 
4. Open problems 
l Obtain a competitive on-line algorithm for the general graph weighted matching 
problem when the edge weights satisfy the triangle inequality. One nice model for 
this problem is as follows: the vertices arrive one at a time, and distances are 
revealed from the newly arrived vertex to all the vertices (even the ones that have 
not arrived yet). The algorithm is required to match off each vertex as it arrives. It is 
easy to show that in case distances are revealed only to the vertices that have 
already arrived, no on-line algorithm having a competitive ratio only as a function 
of n is possible. 
a For the on-line weighted matching problem, is it possible to achieve better 
performance when the points are constrained to lie on the real line, or in the 
plane? 
l Can we get better performance if we consider randomized on-line weighted 
matching algorithms? For example, how badly do randomized greedy algorithms 
do? 
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